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During 2008–2009, we were hit by the Great Recession. Leading up to this 
greatest ﬁnancial crisis since the Great Depression was the Global Imbal-
ance, a phenomenon and a puzzle at that time whether the USA would 
be able to sustain huge trade deﬁcits with the rest of the world. We know 
now that the trade deﬁcits were in fact not sustainable. We are now in 
the aftermath of the correction period, the Great Rebalancing. 
Michael Pettis uses the majority of the chapters in the book to deci-
pher the cause of the puzzle. At the end, he also outlines his predictions 
on how the readjustment will likely take place, and the challenges the 
global economy is facing. The word 'great' in the book's title reﬂects 
the author's sentiment: it will be an extraordinary event in history, and 
will likely be very difﬁcult to achieve. To make it a comprehensive 
book and to help attract a wider audience, Pettis covers policy actions 
in many countries: China, USA, Japan, Germany and the European 
Union. Despite this broad coverage, the focus is unwaveringly on the 
trade relations between the USA and China. Given Pettis' background as 
a former American investment banker and now an economics professor 
at China's Peking University, this came as no surprise. 
Pettis proposes an 'underconsumptionist' theory at the very beginning 
(p. 6). He borrows this from the seventeenth-century British economist 
and philosopher Thomas Mun. In his 1664 book, England's Treasure by 
Foreign Trade, Mun rationalized 'a much more sophisticated argument' 
for trade intervention policy. According to Mun, the purpose of achieving 
a positive trade balance through direct intervention is to 'soberly refrain 
from excessive consumption'. This leads to 'greater availability of capital 
domestically, and so would lower cost of capital for business. It was this 
lower cost of capital that would promote domestic economic growth' 
(pp. 7–8). The chapters that follow expand the argument. However, in 
my view, Chapters 2 and 3 are the heavyweights of the book, where Pet-
tis singles out three major forms of underconsumptionist intervention: 
ﬁnancial repression, currency manipulation and wage growth. 
Has China done all of these? Yes, at some point in China's 35 years 
of reform since 1978. But are they all relevant for the global imbalance 
we see today? I do not think so. On ﬁnancial repression, Pettis makes 
a good point: China is still doing this. Interest rates are not set by the 
market and they are artiﬁcially low. Since depositors lack investment 
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alternatives, very low real interest rates contrarily attract even more 
domestic savings, which translates into unusually high investments. 
It is 'repression' in the sense that a large amount of wealth has been 
transferred from depositors to inefﬁcient state sectors. However, I am 
not sure I agree with the author that the motive for ﬁnancial repression 
is to lower the cost of capital and promote economic growth. The cost 
of capital to state ﬁrms is indeed lower than the equilibrium market 
rate if ﬁnancial repression were absent. We must remember that most 
of China's economic growth over the past three decades has come not 
from state sectors, but from non-state sectors, where the cost of capital 
is actually higher due to private ﬁrms' limited access to both debt and 
equity markets. I tend to characterize state sectors as a vast money-
wasting machine, achieving meagre returns on capital, if not destroying 
capital outright. 
On currency manipulation, Pettis got the facts right, but not the tim-
ing, and he overestimates the importance of currency. Since 2005, the 
Chinese yuan has appreciated by 25–30 percent against the US dollar. 
Yet, during 2005–2007, US trade deﬁcits with China not only did not 
decline, but they continued to soar, at a much accelerated pace. This 
was rather ironic for people who thought currency appreciation alone 
could solve the trade deﬁcits problem. If one looks at a macro chart 
during this period, the rising US trade deﬁcits timed the US housing 
bubble perfectly. The alternative explanation is that the Federal Reserve's 
super-easy monetary policy caused the housing bubble; rising housing 
wealth fuelled American consumption and increased trade deﬁcits. Pet-
tis did not consider this alternative. Instead, he simply blamed China's 
domestic savings–investment imbalance as being solely responsible 
for US trade deﬁcits. He relies on the static gross domestic product ac-
counting identity and declares, 'a change in the relationship between 
savings and investment in one country must force an obverse change in 
the relationship between savings and investment in another country' (p. 
19). Personally, I think both China and the USA were responsible. The 
Chinese government, through export subsidies and currency controls, 
certainly aided the accumulation of US trade deﬁcits. Nevertheless, as 
the old Chinese saying goes, 'one hand can't clap'. I do not think Pettis 
himself really believes that the Chinese were solely responsible; he just 
chose to present a one-sided story. 
On wage growth, Pettis again got the facts right, but again got the 
timing wrong. Before China started state-owned enterprise reform in the 
1980s, enterprise wages indeed were suppressed to support investment. 
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The argument would have been more relevant 20 years ago. Since then 
there have been tremendous changes. The manufacturing landscape is 
very different now and state ﬁrms produce less than one-third of gross 
domestic product. Wages now are mostly set by the market, and there 
are many private players, including foreign-invested ﬁrms. It is true that 
wage growth lagged labour productivity growth for many years. But 
was this due to government intervention? The large supply of migrant 
workers from the countryside has surely been a big factor in keeping 
wage growth in check. If the hukou system were to be removed, wages 
may face even more downward pressure. However, as the supply dwin-
dles, wage growth is set to catch up with labour productivity growth. In 
fact, since 2006, labour shortages have been widely reported. In the last 
few years, we have witnessed the fastest wage increase across China, 
at over 20 percent per year. 
Despite these disagreements, The Great Rebalancing offers a stimulat-
ing read. The author advances many arguments I ﬁnd quite interesting 
and pushes me to rethink issues I tend to take for granted. It certainly 
provides a different perspective. One last thing I would like to point 
out is how to think about trade balances in today's globalized world. In 
recent decades, multinational ﬁrms have routinely moved intermediate 
goods to China for further processing; ﬁnished goods are then re-ex-
ported to the USA. In normal trade statistics computed on the country 
level, the total value of these ﬁnished goods is added to China's export 
totals, despite the fact that China adds only a small portion to the big 
pie. The new nature of the global production chain implies that China 
will tend to run an 'inﬂated' trade surplus with the USA, while it will 
incur large trade deﬁcits with the countries shipping the immediate 
goods, such as Japan and South Korea. This raises a sober question for 
economists and policy makers: should we still discuss trade imbalances 
and conﬂicts based on what happens at the country level? Or, should 
we try a bit more digging at the ﬁrm level?
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